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Abstract We study the implications of procedural fairness on the share of income
that should be redistributed. We formulate procedural fairness as a particular non-
cooperative bargaining game and examine the stationary subgame perfect equilibria
of the game. The equilibrium outcome is called tax equilibrium and is shown to be
unique. The procedurally fair tax rate is defined as the tax rate that results in the
limit of tax equilibria when the probability that negotiations break down converges
to zero. The procedurally fair tax rate is shown to be unique. We also provide a
characterization of the procedurally fair tax rate that involves the probability mass
of below average income citizens and a particular measure of the citizens’ boldness.
This characterization is then used to show that in a number of interesting cases, the
procedurally fair tax rate equals the probability mass of below average income citizens.
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1 Introduction
Modern societies redistribute significant shares of their total income to improve upon
the fairness of the income distribution. To determine what fraction of total income
should be redistributed to obtain a fair income distribution, the standard approach is
to follow Mirrlees (1971) and consists of specifying a social welfare function that has
to be optimized.
One may distinguish fair procedures from fair allocations to decide upon the allo-
cation. Bolton et al. (2005) argue that procedural fairness is conceptually distinct
from allocation fairness, although the two are linked in important ways. This paper is
concerned with the application of procedural fairness to the redistribution of income.
Procedures are deemed fair if they create equal chances for persons involved in the
procedure. It is equal opportunities that matters rather than an equal allocation that
results.
The fair procedure that we want to examine is the unanimous approval procedure.
Under the unanimous approval procedure, a proposal is only carried out if it is approved
by everyone. The unanimous approval procedure follows as a special case of the bar-
gaining models of collective choice considered in Banks and Duggan (2000), when we
restrict recognition probabilities to be uniform and the collection of decisive coalitions
to consist only of the grand coalition. Contrary to the approach in Banks and Dug-
gan (2000) or the case with an evolving status quo in Battaglini and Palfrey (2012),
we intend to use bargaining models of collective choice as normative tools here. The
unanimous approval procedure is motivated by the political theory of the legitimacy of
political authority called contractarianism, which claims that the legitimate authority
of government must derive from the consent of the governed.
We apply the unanimous approval procedure in order to study what fraction of
income should be redistributed on the grounds of procedural fairness. We consider a
society with citizens that are characterized by their pre-tax income and their utility
function, where the distribution of characteristics is given by some probability mea-
sure. A proposal of a citizen therefore specifies a tax rate between zero and one, and
a particular proposal is only implemented if all citizens approve of it. A tax rate of
zero corresponds to the situation of laissez-faire and a tax rate of one to complete
redistribution.
Citizens with below average pre-tax income would prefer complete redistribution,
whereas citizens with above average pre-tax income have a tax rate of zero as their most
preferred tax policy. Citizens with average pre-tax income are indifferent as far as the
tax policy is concerned. Since tax rates are chosen in the unit interval, our analysis leads
to the analysis of one-dimensional bargaining problems. In the bargaining and political
economy literature, such problems are also studied in Banks and Duggan (2000), Imai
and Salonen (2000), Cho and Duggan (2003), Kalandrakis (2006), Cardona and Ponsatí
(2007, 2011), Herings and Predtetchinski (2010), Predtetchinski (2011).
So far, the literature has only studied societies with finitely many agents. In contrast,
we allow for the case where there is a measure space of agents, a modeling assumption
that is very helpful for the analysis of taxation in large populations. The extension to
a measure space of agents makes that we cannot rely on continuity properties in the
proofs of the main results, and we therefore have to resort to different techniques as for
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instance demonstrated by the use of Tarski’s fixed point theorem rather than Brouwer’s
when showing equilibrium existence.
We define a tax equilibrium as the outcomes induced by stationary subgame perfect
equilibria of the unanimous approval procedure for a given breakdown probability. A
tax equilibrium is characterized by the unique proposal made by all above average
income citizens and the unique proposal made by all below average income citizens.
It is shown that in equilibrium the proposals made are accepted unanimously without
delay and that tax equilibria are unique. Below average income citizens propose a
strictly higher tax rate than above average income citizens.
Next, we define the procedurally fair tax rate as the limit of the rates proposed in
a tax equilibrium when the breakdown probability converges to zero. We show that
every society has a unique procedurally fair tax rate.
The procedurally fair tax rate admits a characterization in terms of the probability
mass of citizens with below average income and an appropriate measure of boldness
of the citizens. As shown in Roth (1989), boldness at a certain consumption level
corresponds to the maximum probability by which a citizen prefers a particular gamble
over getting the consumption level for sure. Boldness equals the first derivative of the
utility function divided by utility itself. Tax rate boldness is defined as boldness applied
to the indirect utility function in terms of tax rates. We argue that the bargaining power
of the below average income citizens at a particular tax rate is equal to the supremum
of tax rate boldness among them multiplied by their probability mass. The bargaining
power of the above average income citizens is defined similarly. We demonstrate that
the procedurally fair tax rate is the unique tax rate for which the bargaining power
of the below average income citizens is equal to that of the above average income
citizens.
Our characterization of the procedurally fair tax rate is extremely helpful in com-
putations. For instance, in societies where pre-tax incomes have unbounded support
and all citizens have the same preferences exhibiting constant relative risk aversion,
the procedurally fair tax rate is given by the probability mass of below average income
citizens.
We also consider heterogeneous societies, where the only assumption on prefer-
ences is that, both among below average income citizens and among above average
income citizens, there are citizens that are close to being risk neutral. We obtain a
simple expression for the procedurally fair tax rate, irrespective of the distribution of
pre-tax incomes. When this distribution has unbounded support, we find again that the
procedurally fair tax rate is given by the probability mass of below average income
citizens.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the prim-
itives of our society, and Section 3 discusses the unanimous approval procedure. Sec-
tion 4 defines the notion of tax equilibrium, studies the relation to stationary subgame
perfect equilibria of the unanimous approval procedure, and derives some properties
of tax equilibria. Section 5 discusses the relationship between boldness and bargaining
power and introduces an excess bargaining power function, which is shown to have a
unique zero point. Section 6 demonstrates that this zero point corresponds to the pro-
cedurally fair tax rate in the society. Section 7 uses this result to show that in societies
with citizens having constant relative risk aversion utility functions, the procedurally
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fair tax rate is equal to the probability mass of below average income citizens. The
same result is shown for sufficiently heterogeneous societies Section 8 concludes.
2 The society
We consider a society composed of citizens in a set N , which may contain finitely or
infinitely many elements. The characteristics of citizens are described by (wt , ut )t∈N
and a probability measure μ. A citizen can work up to one unit of time and derives no
disutility from labor. A citizen of type t ∈ N who works one unit of time has pre-tax
income wt ∈ R+ and a utility function ut : [0,+∞) → R.
The triple (N ,A, μ) denotes a probability space, where N is the set of citizens,
A a sigma–algebra of subsets of N , and μ a probability measure that represents the
distribution of types within the population. If N is finite, then we take A to be the
discrete sigma–algebra. We assume wt to be measurable and integrable, and we let
w¯ =
∫
t∈N
wt dμ(t).
denote the average income in society. Furthermore, we denote the types with below
average, average, and above average pre-tax income by N−, N 0, and N+, respectively.
We make the regularity assumption that the probability is zero that a citizen has pre-tax
income exactly equal to the average level, μ(N 0) = 0. Summarizing, our assumptions
are as follows.
Assumption 2.1 It is assumed that wt is measurable and integrable. Moreover,
μ(N 0) = 0, μ(N−) > 0, and μ(N+) > 0. If N is finite, we take A to be the
discrete sigma–algebra.
We let m− = μ(N−) and m+ = μ(N+) be the probability mass of citizens with
below and above average income, respectively.
We address the question of what fraction β ∈ B = [0, 1] of a citizen’s income
should be taxed in order to reach a procedurally fair income distribution. Under a tax
rate of β, total tax revenues are equal to βw¯. Under the requirement of a balanced
budget and equal distribution of tax revenues across citizens, we find that after-tax
income of citizen t is equal to
βw¯ + (1 − β)wt = wt + β(w¯ − wt ).
When β = 0, we obtain the situation of laissez-faire, where after-tax income is
equal to pre-tax income. The case β = 1 corresponds to complete redistribution.
Since we will assume utility functions to be strictly increasing, a citizen’s preferred
point is laissez-faire when his income is above w¯ and complete redistribution for
income below w¯. A household with average income is indifferent with regard to the
tax policy chosen.
A citizen of type t evaluates the after-tax income using a von Neumann–
Morgenstern utility function ut : [0,+∞) → R.
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Assumption 2.2 For each t ∈ N , the utility function ut is continuous, concave,
strictly increasing, and ut (0) = 0.
If the tax rate β ∈ B is agreed upon, citizen t enjoys a utility of
vt (β) = ut (wt + β(w¯ − wt )).
The function vt : B → R defined by the equation above is the indirect utility function
of type t . The indirect utility function vt is nonnegative, continuous, and concave.
Moreover, it holds that vt (β) > 0 whenever 0 < β < 1. For each t ∈ N 0, vt is a
positive constant. For each t ∈ N−, vt is strictly increasing, while for each t ∈ N+,
it is strictly decreasing.
Consider some t ∈ N− ∪ N+. We denote the inverse of the utility function ut by
xt , so for υ a feasible utility level of citizen t, xt (υ) corresponds to the amount of
consumption leading to this utility level. We define
ht (υ) = wt − xt (υ)
wt − w¯ .
The function ht is the inverse of the indirect utility function vt and corresponds to
the tax rate that is needed to achieve a particular utility level. For each t ∈ N−, the
function ht is strictly increasing and convex, while for each t ∈ N+, it is strictly
decreasing and concave.
3 The unanimous approval procedure
The unanimous approval procedure is defined as follows. In every period, each citizen
has an equal chance to be selected as the proposer. Since the distribution of types is
given by the probability measure μ, we have that a citizen of type t is selected as the
proposer according to the probability measure μ. If in period τ a citizen of type t is
selected as the proposer, he makes a proposal pt ∈ B. After observing pt , citizens
decide simultaneously whether to accept or to reject the proposal. If all citizens accept,
pt is implemented, and the utility of a citizen of type i is given by vi (pt ). If one or
more citizens reject, the procedure breaks down with probability 1 − δ leading to the
“no agreement position” and a consumption of 0 for all citizens.1 With probability δ,
the procedure is repeated in period τ + 1 and starts with the selection of a proposer
according to the probability measure μ. We are interested in the proposals that are
made in the limit when δ converges to one.
The unanimous approval procedure leads to a well-defined game in extensive form.
A stationary strategy of a citizen of type t, σt = (pt , At ), consists of a proposal pt ∈ B
and an acceptance set At ⊂ B. The acceptance set At consists of those proposals that
are accepted by a citizen of type t. This specification results in a stationary strategy
1 A procedurally fair procedure should offer equal opportunities to all involved parties. This implies in
particular that, in the absence of agreement, all citizens consume the same amount. We choose this amount
to be zero to ensure that all citizens prefer any positive tax rate to the disagreement point.
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because pt and At are time and history independent. The social acceptance set consists
of the proposals that are accepted by all citizens and is given by A = ∩t∈N At .
Under appropriate measurability conditions, a strategy profile σ = (σt )t∈N deter-
mines a unique probability measure over the tax rates that are implemented and thereby
the expected utility Ut (σ ) for each citizen of type t as evaluated at the beginning of
the game.2 Since strategies are stationary, Ut (σ ) is also the continuation utility of a
citizen of type t, the expected utility as evaluated at the beginning of any time period
τ.
A strategy profile σ = (pt , At )t∈N is an equilibrium if in any subgame the proposal
pt satisfies sequential rationality and the acceptance set At satisfies weak dominance.
Sequential rationality means that in all subgames, for all t ∈ N , pt is optimal given the
strategies of all citizens. An acceptance set satisfies weak dominance when a citizen
accepts a proposal if and only if the utility of the proposal is at least as large as the
continuation utility, so for all t ∈ N , β ∈ At if and only if vt (β) ≥ δUt (σ ). The
restrictions on the acceptance sets are standard in the bargaining literature. We will
define the procedurally fair tax rates as those that are proposed in an equilibrium when
the continuation probability δ tends to one.
4 Tax equilibrium
Consider a strategy profile σ = (pt , At )t∈N which is an equilibrium. Let N a = {t ∈
N | pt ∈ A} denote the set of citizens whose proposal is accepted. Citizen i’s expected
utility Ui (σ ) of the strategy profile σ satisfies the equation
Ui (σ ) =
∫
t∈N a
vi (pt )dμ(t) + (1 − μ(N a))δUi (σ ), i ∈ N . (4.1)
Moreover, we have that
Ai = {β ∈ [0, 1] | vi (β) ≥ δUi (σ )}, i ∈ N . (4.2)
Theorem 4.1 Consider a strategy profile σ = (pt , At )t∈N and the induced social
acceptance set A. If σ is an equilibrium strategy profile, then
[A] For every i ∈ N , pi ∈ A.
[B] The interval [δ p¯, 1 − δ + δ p¯] is contained in A, where p¯ denotes the expected
equilibrium proposal:
p¯ =
∫
t∈N
pt dμ(t).
[C] The set A is a non-empty, compact interval.
2 Suitable measurability conditions are that p : N → [0, 1] be A-measurable, and ∩t∈N At be Borel-
measurable.
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Proof We must have μ(N a) > 0, for otherwise Ut (σ ) = 0 from Eq. (4.1) for all
t ∈ N , and citizens would have a profitable deviation by proposing any tax rate in
(0, 1). Let p¯a denote the average proposal of the citizens in N a, that is,
p¯a = 1
μ(N a)
∫
t∈N a
pt dμ(t).
This expression is well defined since we have argued μ(N a) to be strictly positive. We
have for every i ∈ N ,
vi ( p¯a) ≥ 1
μ(N a)
∫
t∈N a
vi (pt )dμ(t) = 1 − δ + δμ(N
a)
μ(N a)
Ui (σ ) ≥ Ui (σ ),
where the first inequality follows from the concavity of vi and the equality from Eq.
(4.1).
Now consider the interval [δ p¯a, 1 − δ + δ p¯a]. Each of its points can be written in
the form (1 − δ)β + δ p¯a for some β ∈ [0, 1]. Since for every i ∈ N ,
vi ((1 − δ)β + δ p¯a) ≥ (1 − δ)vi (β) + δvi ( p¯a) ≥ δvi ( p¯a) ≥ δUi (σ ),
each point of the interval [δ p¯a, 1 − δ + δ p¯a] is unanimously accepted.
We conclude the proof of the theorem by demonstrating that each citizen in N \ N a
has a profitable deviation from σ , thereby obtaining a contradiction, and showing that
N a = N . Thus, take a citizen t ∈ N such that pt is not an element of A. Citizen t’s
equilibrium proposal pt is rejected and leads to utility δUt (σ ) for citizen t. To obtain
the desired contradiction, it is sufficient to show that there is a point β ∈ A such that
vt (β) > δUt (σ ), for then proposing β, rather than pt , would be a profitable deviation
for citizen t . Suppose first that t ∈ N− ∪ N+. As we have seen above, vt (β) ≥ δUt (σ )
for each β such that δ p¯a ≤ β ≤ 1 − δ + δ p¯a. Since vt is strictly increasing for
t ∈ N− and strictly decreasing for t ∈ N+, we must have vt (β) > δUt (σ ) whenever
δ p¯a < β < 1 − δ + δ p¯a. Suppose next t ∈ N 0. Then, the function vt is a positive
constant, so it follows that any β ∈ [0, 1], and in particular any β ∈ A, has the property
that vt (β) > δvt (β) ≥ δUt (σ ).
From Eq. (4.2) and the fact the function vi is continuous and concave, it follows
that citizen i’s acceptance set Ai is a compact interval. It follows that also the social
acceptance set is a compact interval. 
unionsq
Henceforth, we denote the interval A by [β−, β+]. By the preceding theorem, the
set A contains an interval of length 1 − δ, so it follows that
β+ − β− ≥ 1 − δ. (4.3)
The proposal of a citizen of type t is the point in A closest to his most preferred
point. Therefore, if t ∈ N+ then pt = β− and if t ∈ N− then pt = β+. For t ∈ N 0,
the indirect utility function is a constant, so citizen t’s proposal can be an arbitrary
element of the social acceptance set. Hence, Equation (4.1) simplifies to
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Ui (σ ) = m−vi (β+) + m+vi (β−), i ∈ N .
Thus, the social acceptance set [β−, β+] and the individual acceptance sets in an
equilibrium strategy profile are such that
[β−, β+] =
⋂
i∈N
Ai , (4.4)
Ai = {β ∈ [0, 1] | vi (β) ≥ δ[m−vi (β+) + m+vi (β−)]}, i ∈ N . (4.5)
In what follows, we provide a characterization of the endpoints of the social accep-
tance set in an equilibrium strategy profile as a fixed point of an appropriately defined
function. Recall that hi has been defined for each i ∈ N− ∪ N+ as the inverse of the
function vi . For each i ∈ N− ∪ N+, we define
f1i (β−) = hi (α+vi (β−)), where α+ = δm+/(1 − δ + δm+), (4.6)
f2i (β+) = hi (α−vi (β+)), where α− = δm−/(1 − δ + δm−). (4.7)
The definition of f1i (β−) ensures that a citizen i is indifferent between a tax rate equal
to f1i (β−) and a gamble where the tax rate is f1i (β−) with probability δm−, a tax rate
β− with probability δm+, and zero consumption with probability 1− δ. Similarly, the
definition of f2i (β+) ensures that a citizen i is indifferent between a tax rate equal to
f2i (β+) and a gamble where the tax rate is f2i (β+) with probability δm+, a tax rate
β+ with probability δm−, and zero consumption with probability 1 − δ.
Define the functions f1 : [0, 1] → [0, 1] and f2 : [0, 1] → [0, 1] by letting
f1(β−) = min
{
1, inf
i∈N+
f1i (β−)
}
,
f2(β+) = max
{
0, sup
i∈N−
f2i (β+)
}
.
Lemma 4.2 Let [β−, β+] be the social acceptance set induced by an equilibrium
strategy profile. Then,
β+ = f1(β−),
β− = f2(β+).
Proof We show that the second of these equations holds. The proof of the first one is
similar. Since β− is in the social acceptance set, it belongs to every citizen’s individual
acceptance set Ai . Hence, by (4.5)
vi (β
−) ≥ δm−vi (β+) + δm+vi (β−), i ∈ N .
Using the fact that m− + m+ = 1 and rearranging, we find that
vi (β
−) ≥ α−vi (β+), i ∈ N .
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Now consider a citizen i ∈ N−. For each such citizen i , the function hi is strictly
increasing. Hence, applying hi to the preceding equation yields
β− = hi (vi (β−)) ≥ hi (α−vi (β+)) = f2i (β+), i ∈ N−.
We conclude that β− ≥ f2(β+). Now suppose β− ≥ f2(β+) + ε for some ε > 0.
Then,
β− − ε ≥ hi (α−vi (β+)), i ∈ N−.
Applying the increasing function vi to the above inequality yields
vi (β
− − ε) ≥ vi (hi (α−vi (β+))) = α−vi (β+), i ∈ N−.
But, then the point
β = (1 − δm+)(β− − ε) + δm+β−
is in the acceptance set of each citizen i ∈ N−, because
vi (β) ≥ (1 − δm+)vi (β− − ε) + δm+vi (β−)
≥ (1 − δm+)α−vi (β+) + δm+vi (β−)
= δm−vi (β+) + δm+vi (β−)
= δUi (σ ),
where the inequality in the first line follows by concavity of vi . Since β < β− is clearly
in the acceptance set of each citizen in i ∈ N 0 ∪ N+, it is in the social acceptance set.
This clearly contradicts the fact that β− is the left endpoint of the social acceptance
set. 
unionsq
The first equality in the preceding lemma expresses that β+ should be sufficiently
low to make it acceptable for all above average income citizens, and similarly, the
second equality specifies that β− should be sufficiently high to be acceptable for all
below average income citizens. It motivates the following definition.
Definition 4.3 A tax equilibrium is pair (β−, β+) satisfying
β+ = f1(β−),
β− = f2(β+).
As it is immediate from the definition, every equilibrium strategy profile induces a
tax equilibrium. We now establish the converse, stating every tax equilibrium corre-
sponds to an equilibrium strategy profile, showing that the concepts are equivalent.
Theorem 4.4 Given a tax equilibrium (β−, β+), there is an equilibrium strategy
profile σ with social acceptance set equal to [β−, β+].
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Proof Define pt to be β+ for each t ∈ N 0 ∪ N− and β− for each t ∈ N+. Define the
individual acceptance sets by Eq. (4.5), so they satisfy weak dominance by definition.
An argument similar to that in the proof of Lemma 4.2 can be used to show that Eq.
(4.4) holds.
It remains to verify sequential rationality of the proposals. It is a routine excercise
to demonstrate that no type has a profitable one-shot deviation from σ when being the
proposer. Here, a one-shot deviation in a subgame is a single deviation by a player at the
root of the subgame. It follows from a standard argument, see for instance Fudenberg
and Tirole (1991), that if there is a subgame where a type has some profitable deviation
from σ, then there must also be a subgame where this type has a profitable one-shot
deviation. 
unionsq
Define the function f : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1]2 by letting
f (β+, β−) = ( f1(β−), f2(β+)).
Clearly, the tax equilibria are exactly the fixed points of the function f .
Theorem 4.5 A tax equilibrium exists.
Proof The set [0, 1]2 is a complete lattice, and the function f has the property that
f1(β) ≤ f1(β ′) and f2(β) ≤ f2(β ′) whenever β ≤ β ′. Hence, Tarski’s fixed point
theorem implies that f has a fixed point. 
unionsq
Theorem 4.6 A tax equilibrium is unique.
Proof Consider the function g : [0, 1] → R defined by g(β) = f1( f2(β)) − β.
Obviously, a zero point β of g is in a one-to-one relationship with a tax equilibrium
( f2(β), β), and it follows from the previous paragraph that g has at least one zero
point. We argue that g is strictly decreasing, thereby showing that it has a unique zero
point.
We write
g(β) = f1( f2(β)) − f2(β) + f2(β) − β.
We show first that f2(β) − β is strictly decreasing in β. Consider some i ∈ N− and
β, β ′ with β < β ′. Since hi is a convex and increasing function, we have
f2i (β) − f2i (β ′) = hi (α−vi (β)) − hi (α−vi (β ′))
≥ α−[hi (vi (β)) − hi (vi (β ′))]
= α−(β − β ′),
hence
f2i (β) ≥ α−(β − β ′) + f2i (β ′).
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Taking the supremum with respect to i ∈ N− on both sides of the preceding equation
yields
sup
i∈N−
f2i (β) ≥ α−[β − β ′] + sup
i∈N−
f2i (β ′).
Hence,
sup
i∈N−
f2i (β) − β ≥ sup
i∈N−
f2i (β ′) − β ′ + (1 − α−)(β ′ − β) > sup
i∈N−
f2i (β ′) − β ′,
which implies that
sup
i∈N−
f2i (β) − β
is strictly decreasing in β. Notice that
f2(β) − β = max
{ − β, sup
i∈N−
f2i (β) − β
}
,
so, it is the maximum of two expressions strictly decreasing in β, and therefore strictly
decreasing itself. A completely symmetric argument shows that f1(β) − β is strictly
decreasing in β. Since the function f2 is increasing, f1( f2(β)) − f2(β) is decreasing
in β. Since f2(β)−β is strictly decreasing in β, we have that g is a strictly decreasing
function. 
unionsq
The unanimous approval procedure results in a unique tax equilibrium (β−, β+)
with β− < β+. The tax rate proposed by an above average income citizen is β−,
whereas β+ is proposed by below average income citizens. A proposal β strictly
smaller than β− would be rejected by at least one below average income citizen, and
a proposal β strictly greater than β+ by at least one above average income citizen. At
equilibrium, rejections do not occur.
5 Boldness and bargaining power
Aumann and Kurz (1977) observe that the Nash bargaining solution for the two player
case can be characterized as selecting a division of the potential surplus at which the
players are equally bold. Assuming a differentiable utility function, the boldness of a
citizen of type t at consumption ct equals u′t (ct )/ut (ct ). In this section, we study the
relation between tax equilibria and the boldness of citizens.
Consider a gamble where a citizen of type t receives consumption 0 with probability
qt and ct + ε with probability 1 − qt , where ε > 0. Let qt (ct , ε) be the maximum
probability for which a citizen of type t weakly prefers the gamble over consuming
ct for sure. As pointed out in Roth (1989), boldness corresponds to the maximum
probability for which type t is willing to accept the gamble, per dollar of additional
gains, when ε tends to zero. That is, the boldness of a citizen of type t at consumption
ct is equal to limε↓0 qt (ct , ε)/ε.
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Since we do not assume that utility functions are differentiable, we extend the
notion of boldness in the following way. The boldness of a citizen of type t at ct > 0
is defined as
bt (ct ) = ∂+ut (ct )/ut (ct ),
where ∂+ut denotes the right derivative of ut . Left derivatives will be denoted by
∂−. We define bt (0) = +∞. Since utility functions are assumed to be concave, the
right derivative of the utility function is well defined. Moreover, boldness is a strictly
decreasing function of consumption, as the numerator in the definition of boldness is
decreasing by concavity of ut and the denominator is strictly increasing since ut is
strictly increasing in consumption.
The next result shows that also in the absence of differentiability, boldness still
admits an interpretation in terms of gambles.
Theorem 5.1 For ct > 0, it holds that bt (ct ) = limε↓0 qt (ct , ε)/ε.
Proof By continuity of ut and for ε sufficiently small, it holds that
ut (ct ) = qt (ct , ε)ut (0) + (1 − qt (ct , ε))ut (ct + ε).
We use that ut (0) = 0 and rearrange terms to find that
qt (ct , ε)
ε
= ut (ct + ε) − ut (ct )
ε
1
ut (ct + ε) .
When ε tends to zero, we find that the first term in the product converges to the right
derivative of ut at ct due to concavity of ut and the second term converges to ut (ct )
because of continuity, so
lim
ε↓0
qt (ct , ε)
ε
= ∂+ut (ct )
ut (ct )
.

unionsq
It follows immediately from Theorem 5.1 and the concavity of ut that an alternative
characterization of bt (ct ) can be given as the limit inferior of difference quotients of
ut at ct . We observe that bt is a strictly decreasing function, which may have points
of discontinuity.
For each β ∈ (0, 1), define
d1t (β) = −∂−vt (β)
vt (β)
= (wt − w¯)bt (wt + β(w¯ − wt )),
d2t (β) = ∂+vt (β)
vt (β)
= (w¯ − wt )bt (wt + β(w¯ − wt )).
The above expressions are well defined since vt (β) > 0 for each β ∈ (0, 1).
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We will show that these functions yield the appropriate measure of boldness of
a citizen of type t at a tax rate equal to β, where d1t applies to types with above
average income and d2t to those with below average income. We refer to this measure
of boldness as tax rate boldness. Indeed, for a type t in N+, tax rate boldness d1t (β)
is equal to the usual definition of boldness applied to the (increasing) indirect utility
function −vt , which in turn is equal to his boldness at the consumption wt +β(w¯−wt )
induced by the tax rate β, multiplied by wt − w¯, which equals the marginal change
in consumption due to a change in the tax rate. Similarly, d2t (β) is the appropriate
measure for boldness corresponding to tax rate proposals for below average income
types.
Since boldness is strictly decreasing in consumption, it holds that tax rate boldness
d1t is strictly increasing in β, whereas d2t is strictly decreasing in β. What will matter
in the end is to convince the boldest citizen to accept a proposal, which motivates the
following definitions. For β ∈ (0, 1), let
d1(β) = sup
t∈N+
d1t (β),
d2(β) = sup
t∈N−
d2t (β).
At this point, it is useful to provide some intuition as to why the tax rate bold-
ness functions d1 and d2 are useful in characterizing tax equilibria. Suppose indirect
utility functions are differentiable and suppose that we can replace the indirect utility
functions by their first-order approximations around the expected equilibrium offer
β¯:
vt (β) ≈ vt (β¯) + v′t (β¯)(β − β¯).
A type t ∈ N accepts a proposal β if and only if vt (β¯) + v′t (β¯)(β − β¯) ≥ δvt (β¯).
Using that for t ∈ N+, v′t (β¯) < 0 and for t ∈ N−, v′t (β¯) > 0, we find that a type
t ∈ N+ accepts all proposals β satisfying
β ≤ β¯ − (1 − δ)vt (β¯)
v′t (β¯)
,
whereas types t ∈ N− accept all proposals β satisfying
β ≥ β¯ − (1 − δ)vt (β¯)
v′t (β¯)
.
The endpoints of the social acceptance set are therefore given by
β− = β¯ − (1 − δ) inf
t∈N−
{
vt (β¯)
v′t (β¯)
}
= β¯ − 1 − δ
d2(β¯)
,
β+ = β¯ − (1 − δ) sup
t∈N+
{
vt (β¯)
v′t (β¯)
}
= β¯ + 1 − δ
d1(β¯)
.
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Since the expected equilibrium offer is given by β¯ = m+β− + m−β+, we find that
β¯ = m+β¯ − m+ 1 − δ
d2(β¯)
+ m−β¯ + m− 1 − δ
d1(β¯)
.
Since m+ +m− = 1, we can rearrange terms and find that m+d1(β¯) = m−d2(β¯). We
will demonstrate in Sect. 6 that the intuition coming from first-order approximations
can be made precise.
For each β ∈ (0, 1), we define
z(β) = m−d2(β) − m+d1(β).
It will be convenient to extend the function z to the whole interval [0, 1] by letting
z(0) = +∞ and z(1) = −∞. The function z is the difference between the supremum
of tax rate boldness among below average income types multiplied by their probability
mass m− and the supremum of tax rate boldness among above average income types
multiplied by their probability mass m+. The function z can be interpreted as an “excess
bargaining power function,” where positive values of z(β) indicate that below average
income types have more bargaining power than above average income types, causing
increases in the tax rate, and the reverse when z(β) is negative. Indeed, m+d1(β)
represents the bargaining power of the rich, and m−d2(β) the bargaining power of
the poor. We can think of z(β) as the direction and magnitude by which β would be
adjusted as a consequence of the prevailing bargaining forces.
Theorem 5.2 The excess bargaining power function z is strictly decreasing on [0, 1].
The proof of Theorem 5.2 can be found in Appendix A. It consists of showing that
d1 is finite and strictly increasing and that d2 is finite and strictly decreasing.
A point β∗ ∈ [0, 1] is called a generalized zero point of z if z(β) > 0 for β < β∗
and z(β) < 0 for β > β∗. When applied to the case β∗ = 0, then being a generalized
zero point means z(β) < 0 for all β > 0, and similarly β∗ = 1 is a generalized zero
point of z if z(β) > 0 for all β < 1. Since z is strictly decreasing by Theorem 5.2, it
follows that z has a unique generalized zero point.
Corollary 5.3 The excess bargaining power function z has a unique generalized zero
point.
At the generalized zero pointβ∗ of z, the difference between m−d2(β) and m+d1(β)
is minimized and is equal to zero if z is continuous at β∗. The point β∗ is therefore the
tax rate where the bargaining power of citizens with below average income is as close
as possible to that of above average income citizens. We will show in Theorem 6.4
that all proposals made in tax equilibria converge to the unique generalized zero point
of z when δ converges to 1.
When the set of citizens is finite, the excess bargaining function z as defined above
coincides with the characteristic function ξ as defined in Predtetchinski (2011), who
also proves that ξ is a strictly decreasing function. His proof however only applies
when there are finitely many citizens.
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6 Procedurally fair tax rates
In this section, we establish that the procedurally fair tax rate is equal to the generalized
zero point of the function z.
We show first that along any convergent sequence of tax equilibria, as the continu-
ation probability δ converges to one, the social acceptance set converges to a singleton
set.
Theorem 6.1 Let (δn)n∈N be a sequence converging to 1 and, for n ∈ N, let (β−n , β+n )
be the tax equilibrium corresponding to δn. Suppose the sequence (β−n )n∈N converges
to a point β− and the sequence (β+n )n∈N converges to β+. Then, β− = β+.
Proof We know that β−n ≤ β+n for each n. Hence, β− ≤ β+. The point β−n , being an
element of the social acceptance set in a tax equilibrium, is accepted by all citizens. In
particular, for i ∈ N−, we havevi (β−n ) ≥ δn(m−vi (β+n )+m+vi (β−n )). Taking the limit
of both sides of the inequality as n goes to infinity, we obtain vi (β−) ≥ m−vi (β+) +
m+vi (β−). Rearranging yields vi (β−) ≥ vi (β+). Since vi is an increasing function
for i ∈ N−, we have β− ≥ β+. 
unionsq
We define a procedurally fair tax rate as the limit of proposals in a tax equilibrium
when the continuation probability δ converges to one.
Definition 6.2 The tax rate β is procedurally fair if it is the limit of a sequence
(βt,n)n∈N, where βt,n is the proposal of a citizen t in the tax equilibrium corresponding
to δn and (δn)n∈N is a sequence converging to one.
Since the first-order approximations used in Section 5 are not exact, it is not exactly
true that the expected proposal in the tax equilibrium equals the zero point β∗ of z,
even if all indirect utility functions were differentiable. Theorem 6.3 demonstrates that
nevertheless it is true that β− ≤ β∗ ≤ β+.
Theorem 6.3 The tax equilibrium (β−, β+) satisfies β− ≤ β∗ ≤ β+, where β∗ is
the generalized zero point of z.
The proof of Theorem 6.3 is relegated to Appendix B. Although our proof tech-
nique is similar to that in Predtetchinski (2011), we are able to simplify some of the
derivations using the special structure of the payoff functions at hand, in particular the
fact that vt is increasing for each t ∈ N− and decreasing for each t ∈ N+.
Combining Theorem 6.1 and 6.3, it follows that the procedurally fair tax rate is
unique and is equal to the generalized zero point of the function z, so we obtain the
following results.
Theorem 6.4 Let (δn)n∈N be a sequence converging to 1 and, for n ∈ N, let (β−n , β+n )
be the tax equilibrium of the game corresponding to δn. Then, both sequences (β−n )n∈N
and (β+n )n∈N converge to the generalized zero point β∗ of z.
Corollary 6.5 A society has a unique procedurally fair tax rate.
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7 Two illustrative examples
In this section, we consider two special cases of the model. The case where the citizens
exhibit constant relative risk aversion and the case where there are sufficiently many
risk-neutral citizens. We conclude in both cases that the procedurally tax rate equals
the total measure of below average income citizens, m−.
7.1 The case of constant relative risk aversion
As an illustration, consider the case where all citizens t ∈ N have constant relative
risk aversion utility functions
ut (ct ) = c1−γt , ct ∈ R+,
where γ ∈ [0, 1) is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Moreover, we assume that
inf
t∈N wt = 0 and supt∈N wt = +∞.
It is straightforward to derive that tax rate boldness of an above average income citizen
t ∈ N+ is given by
d1t (β) = (1 − γ )(wt − w¯)
(1 − β)wt + βw¯ , β ∈ [0, 1].
Since, for a given tax rate β, this expression is increasing in wt , it attains its maximum
value when t is equal to the highest income citizen. Since the support ofμ is unbounded,
we have that the bargaining power of the rich is given by
m+d1(β) = m+ sup
t∈N+
d1t (β) = m+ 1 − γ1 − β , β ∈ [0, 1).
The tax rate boldness of a below average income citizen t ∈ N− is equal to
d2t (β) = (1 − γ )(w¯ − wt )
(1 − β)wt + βw¯ , β ∈ (0, 1].
For given tax rate β, this expression is decreasing in wt , and the maximum over
t ∈ N− is therefore attained by the lowest income citizen. We have that the bargaining
power of the poor is equal to
m−d2(β) = m− sup
t∈N−
d2t (β) = m− 1 − γ
β
, β ∈ (0, 1].
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The unique zero point of the excess bargaining power function
z(β) = m−d2(β) − m+d1(β) = m− 1 − γ
β
− m+ 1 − γ
1 − β , β ∈ (0, 1),
is given by β = m−. The unique procedurally fair tax rate of a society populated
by constant relative risk aversion citizens is equal to the probability mass of below
average income citizens, irrespective of the shape of the distribution μ of types within
the population.
7.2 Heterogeneous societies
In this section, we analyze the procedurally fair tax rate for societies with sufficiently
heterogeneous citizens. What we have in mind is that there is sufficient dispersion in
preferences among citizens, in particular in terms of boldness. From a technical point
of view, we make the assumption that there are risk-neutral types having very high
and risk-neutral types having very low income.
Let S be the set of citizens t ∈ N such that ut (x) = x, x ∈ R+. We assume that
inf
t∈S wt = 0 and supt∈S wt = +∞.
The importance of risk-neutral individuals stems from the fact that these individuals
display the greatest boldness in the society. This implies that it is effectively the risk-
neutral individuals who determine the endpoints of the social acceptance set.
We derive in Appendix C that
d1(β) = 11 − β , (7.1)
d2(β) = 1
β
. (7.2)
The excess bargaining power function z is then given by
z(β) = m
−
β
− m
+
1 − β .
Clearly, z(m−) = 0, so m− is the procedurally fair tax rate.
The result that emerges from this paper is that under a wide variety of circumstances,
m− appears as the procedurally fair tax rate. This result is in sharp contrast to the
literature on fairness that often argues in favor of complete redistribution, implying a
tax rate equal to one. The result is also not out of line of what is observed in reality.
Mankiw et al. (2009) report that the average top marginal tax wedge in 2007, which
combines the top marginal income tax rate with the rate of value-added tax, is just above
60 percent in OECD countries and was in fact nearly 80 percent in 1984. We remark
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that this finding is subject to a number of qualifications, including our assumption that
pre-tax incomes are not affected by the tax rate.
8 Conclusion
We study the implications of procedural fairness for the share of income that should be
redistributed. Procedural fairness is modeled as the outcome of a bargaining procedure
where all citizens have an equal chance to propose, and all have to agree to a proposal
in order for it to be implemented. Societies are shown to have unique procedurally fair
tax rates. We also provide a characterization of the procedurally fair tax rate, which
can be used to demonstrate that the procedurally fair tax rate is equal to the probability
mass m− of below average income citizens in a variety of circumstances.
This paper has confined itself to a rather simple economic environment in order
to obtain sharp results. Many extensions of the model are worthwhile to investigate.
We have started our analysis from exogenously given pre-tax incomes. An interesting
avenue for research is to make labor supply endogenous, the main channel through
which complete redistribution is avoided in the traditional optimal taxation literature.
One would expect that also in our set-up, the incorporation of elastic labor supply
leads to a reduction of the procedurally fair tax rate below m−.
In this paper, we study the share of income that should be redistributed on the
grounds of procedural fairness. In terms of tax schedules, this implies a limitation to
affine tax schedules, consisting of a fixed subsidy to all citizens and constant marginal
tax rates. Mirrlees (1971) argued that affine tax schedules are nearly optimal in the
context of the traditional optimal taxation literature. Though this view has been chal-
lenged many times, Mankiw et al. (2009) claim that proposals for a flat tax are not
inherently unreasonable. It is an open issue whether flat tax schedules are also nearly
optimal in our framework.
Appendix A The proof of theorem 5.2
Theorem 5.2 follows immediately from Lemmas 8.1 and 8.2 below.
Lemma 8.1 The function d1 is a strictly increasing function on (0, 1) assuming only
finite values.
Proof Consider some t ∈ N+ and some β ∈ (0, 1). Using vt (1) ≥ 0 and the concavity
of vt , we find that
−(1 − β)∂−vt (β) ≤ vt (β).
Rearranging yields the inequality
d1t (β) ≤ 11 − β .
123
Redistributive proportional tax 351
This establishes the finiteness of d1 on (0, 1). We show that d1 is strictly increasing.
Let β and β ′ be elements of (0, 1) such that β < β ′. For t ∈ N+ we have
−∂−vt (β)(β ′ − β) ≤ vt (β) − vt (β ′)
We therefore obtain
−∂−vt (β)(vt (β ′) − ∂−vt (β ′)(β ′ − β)) ≤ −∂−vt (β)vt (β ′) − ∂−vt (β ′)(vt (β) − vt (β ′))
= (∂−vt (β ′) − ∂−vt (β))vt (β ′) − ∂−vt (β ′)vt (β)
≤ −∂−vt (β ′)vt (β),
where the last inequality uses vt (β ′) ≥ 0 and concavity. Dividing both sides of the
inequality by vt (β)vt (β ′) gives
d1t (β)(1 + (β ′ − β)d1t (β ′)) ≤ d1t (β ′).
Dividing by d1t (β ′) yields the inequality
d1t (β) ≤ d1t (β
′)
1 + (β ′ − β)d1t (β ′) .
Taking the supremum with respect to t ∈ N+ yields
d1(β) = sup
t∈N+
d1t (β) ≤ sup
t∈N+
d1t (β ′)
1 + (β ′ − β)d1t (β ′) ≤
d1(β ′)
1 + (β ′ − β)d1(β ′) < d1(β
′).
This completes the proof. 
unionsq
The proof that the function d2 is strictly decreasing follows by a similar argument
and is therefore omitted.
Lemma 8.2 The function d2 is a strictly decreasing function on (0, 1) assuming only
finite values.
Appendix B The proof of theorem 6.3
Consider the bargaining equilibrium (β−, β+) and consider the bargaining power of
the poor and the rich, respectively, at the upper bound β+ of the social acceptance
set. Lemma 8.3 states that the size of the social acceptance set β+ − β− multiplied
by the bargaining power of the poor m−d2(β+) is bounded from above by (1 − δ)/δ,
and is greater than or equal to this number when multiplied by the bargaining power
m+d1(β−) of the rich.
Lemma 8.3 Consider the tax equilibrium (β−, β+). If β+ < 1, then
1. δm−d2(β+)(β+ − β−) ≤ (1 − δ).
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2. δm+d1(β+)(β+ − β−) ≥ (1 − δ).
Proof For t ∈ N−, it holds that the proposal β− is accepted, so δ(m−vt (β+) +
m+vt (β−)) ≤ vt (β−). Rewriting this inequality results in
δm−(vt (β+) − vt (β−)) ≤ (1 − δ)vt (β−) ≤ (1 − δ)vt (β+).
Since vt is concave, we find that
δm−∂+vt (β+)(β+ − β−) ≤ (1 − δ)vt (β+),
and therefore δm−d2t (β+)(β+ − β−) ≤ 1 − δ. Since this inequality holds for all
t ∈ N−, we obtain
δm−d2(β+)(β+ − β−) = sup
t∈N−
δm−d2t (β+)(β+ − β−) ≤ 1 − δ.
This proves Lemma 8.3.1.
Consider some t ∈ N+. By concavity of vt we have that −∂−vt (β+)(β+ − β−) ≥
vt (β
−) − vt (β+). It then follows that
d1t (β+)(β+ − β−) ≥ vt (β
−)
vt (β+)
− 1.
We take the supremum over all t ∈ N+ and find that
d1(β+)(β+ − β−) ≥ sup
t∈N+
vt (β
−)
vt (β+)
− 1.
We complete the proof of Lemma 8.3.2 by showing that
δm+
(
sup
t∈N+
vt (β
−)
vt (β+)
− 1
)
= 1 − δ,
or equivalently
sup
t∈N+
δ(m−vt (β+) + m+vt (β−))
vt (β+)
= 1.
Since all t ∈ N+ accept the proposal β+, we have
δ(m−vt (β+) + m+vt (β−))
vt (β+)
≤ 1, t ∈ N+.
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Suppose there is an ε > 0 with the property
δ(m−vt (β+) + m+vt (β−))
vt (β+)
≤ 1 − ε
for all t ∈ N+. Then
vt ((1 − ε)β+ + ε) ≥ (1 − ε)vt (β+) + εvt (1) ≥ (1 − ε)vt (β+)
≥ δ(m−vt (β+) + m+vt (β−)).
All citizens t ∈ N+ (as well as citizens in N− ∪ N 0) therefore accept the proposal
(1 − ε)β+ + ε > β+ thereby contradicting that β+ is the upper bound of the social
acceptance set. 
unionsq
We are now in a position to prove the first half of Theorem 6.3.
Lemma 8.4 The tax equilibrium (β−, β+) satisfies β∗ ≤ β+, where β∗ is the gener-
alized zero point of z.
Proof The result is obviously true when β+ = 1. In particular, if δ = 0 then β+ = 1
and β− = 0 by Equation (4.3). Suppose now δ > 0 and β+ < 1. Subtracting the
second inequality of Lemma 8.3 from the first one gives δz(β+)(β+ −β−) ≤ 0. Since
by (4.3) 0 < β+ − β−, it follows that z(β+) ≤ 0. The result follows since z is a
decreasing function. 
unionsq
The proof of the second half of Theorem 6.3 follows from an analogous argument
and is therefore omitted.
Appendix C The derivation of Equations (7.1)–(7.2)
We provide a derivation of Equations (7.1)–(7.2).
For each t ∈ N and each ct > 0, we have 0 = ut (0) ≤ ut (ct ) − ct∂+ut (ct ), where
the inequality holds by the concavity of ut . Rearranging this expression, we obtain
that
bt (ct ) ≤ 1
ct
, ct > 0. (8.1)
For each t ∈ N+ ∩ S, we have
d1t (β) = wt − w¯
wt + β(w¯ − wt ) , β ∈ (0, 1)
This expression is non–decreasing in wt on [w¯,+∞), and it converges to 1/(1 − β)
as wt approaches infinity. As the set {wt | t ∈ S} is unbounded from above, it holds
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that d1(β) ≥ 11−β . On the other hand, for each t ∈ N+ it holds that
d1t (β) = (wt − w¯)bt (wt + β(w¯ − wt )) ≤ wt − w¯
wt + β(w¯ − wt ) ≤
1
1 − β , β ∈ (0, 1),
where the first inequality is implied by (8.1). It follows that d1(β) ≤ 1/(1−β), which
proves Eq. (7.1).
Similarly for each citizen t ∈ N− ∩ S, we have
d2t (β) = w¯ − wt
wt + β(w¯ − wt ) , β ∈ (0, 1).
Since the infimum of {wt | t ∈ S} is zero, it holds that d2(β) ≥ 1/β. On the other
hand, for each t ∈ N− it holds that
d2t (β) = (w¯ − wt )bt (wt + β(w¯ − wt )) ≤ w¯ − wt
wt + β(w¯ − wt ) ≤
1
β
, β ∈ (0, 1),
where the first inequality follows by (8.1). It follows that d2(β) ≤ 1/β, which proves
Eq. (7.2).
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